Do Immigrants Displace Black and Hispanic Workers? What the Labor Data Shows

As immigration remains a focal point of the Trump administration's second-term agenda in 2026, political rhetoric has increasingly centered on the domestic labor market. A recurring claim voiced by President Trump and conservative commentators is that high levels of immigration—particularly undocumented immigration—directly harm native-born minority workers by taking "Black jobs" and "Hispanic jobs." This framing presents a zero-sum conflict, suggesting that immigrant employment gains come at the direct expense of American-born Black and Hispanic workers.

To evaluate this claim, we analyze U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, historical employment trends, and the consensus of labor economists who study the dynamics of worker displacement, wage growth, and labor market participation.

Employment Rates and the Nativity Data

The phrase "Black jobs" and "Hispanic jobs" has drawn criticism from civil rights groups and labor economists, who point out that there are no such categories in the American economy. However, if the underlying theory behind the claim—that immigrants displace native-born minorities—were true, we would expect to see native-born Black and Hispanic unemployment rising in tandem with immigration.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) report on the Labor Force Characteristics of Foreign-Born Workers, published on May 19, 2026, foreign-born workers made up 19.1% of the U.S. civilian labor force in 2025 [1]. This represents a steady increase from 18.6% in 2023 and 19.0% in 2024, reflecting the ongoing integration of foreign-born workers into the U.S. economy [1].

Despite this increase in the immigrant labor supply, unemployment rates for native-born workers remained historically low. In 2025, the unemployment rate for foreign-born workers was 4.2%, while the rate for native-born workers was 4.3% [1]. Rather than displacing native-born workers, the data shows that the labor market expanded to accommodate both groups.

Concurrent Record Lows: A Historical Comparison

A review of monthly unemployment figures from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) shows that the peak years of recent immigration coincided with the strongest labor markets for Black and Hispanic Americans in U.S. history [2][3].

Under the first Trump administration, the Black unemployment rate reached a then-record low of 5.3% in August 2019 [2]. During the post-pandemic recovery under the Biden-Harris administration, the rate dropped even further, hitting an all-time record low of 4.7% in April 2023 [2].

Similarly, the Hispanic or Latino unemployment rate reached an annual average of 4.3% in 2019, peaking monthly at 4.1% in late 2019 [3]. In the post-pandemic expansion, it fell to a historic low of 3.9% in September 2022 [3].

As of May 2026, the Black unemployment rate stands at 6.6% (down from 7.3% in April 2026), and the Hispanic unemployment rate stands at 5.0% [2][3]. While these rates have ticked up due to high interest rates and cooling labor demand from the Federal Reserve's anti-inflation campaign, they remain well below historical averages.

Why Immigrants and Native Workers are Complementary

Why does the entry of foreign-born workers not lead to the mass displacement of native minority workers? Labor economists point to two primary reasons: occupational differences and demand-side economic expansion.

1. Occupational Differences and Skill Profiles

Immigrants and native-born workers are often not in direct competition because they have different skill distributions and fill different occupational niches. For example, U.S.-born Black and Hispanic workers are increasingly highly educated and hold specialized credentials compared to newly arrived immigrants.

According to the 2025 BLS data, among the labor force aged 25 and older, 17.0% of foreign-born workers had not completed high school, compared to just 3.2% of native-born workers [1]. Conversely, native-born workers are far more likely to have completed high school or college, making them qualified for roles that require formal credentials, licensing, or high levels of English communication.

In industries like construction, native-born workers are more likely to work as supervisors, electricians, or plumbers, while newly arrived immigrants are more likely to work as drywall installers, painters, or laborers. This occupational sorting means that the two groups complement each other: an increase in immigrant laborers makes it possible for construction companies to take on more projects, which in turn creates more jobs for native-born foremen, inspectors, and specialized tradespeople.

2. The Demand-Side Expansion

A second key economic concept is that the labor market is not a fixed pie. Newly arrived immigrants are not just workers; they are also consumers who buy groceries, rent homes, pay for transportation, and purchase services. This increases aggregate demand, prompting businesses to expand and hire more workers. Research from the Brookings Institution shows that the influx of consumer demand from new immigrants actively generates new jobs, offsetting the direct supply effect in the labor market [7].

The Academic Divide: When Competition Occurs

While the broad consensus of economists rejects the zero-sum displacement narrative, researchers acknowledge that immigration does not affect all native-born workers equally. There is a long-standing academic debate on the extent of localized wage pressure.

A seminal study by Harvard economist George Borjas and co-authors Jeffrey Grogger and Gordon Hanson examined Census data from 1960 to 2000 [4]. Borjas argued that low-skilled immigration acts as a "supply shock" that can depress wages for native-born workers with similar education levels. Their research estimated that a Disproportionate increase in the supply of a specific educational cohort was associated with a 2.5% to 4.0% reduction in wages for Black men in that cohort, alongside a decline in their employment rate [4].

However, this finding is contested by other prominent labor economists. Studies on historical immigration surges, such as David Card's landmark 1990 study of the Mariel Boatlift (which brought 125,000 Cuban immigrants to Miami in 1980, increasing the city's labor force by 7%), found no significant negative impact on the wages or employment rates of Miami's low-skilled native workers, including Black residents [6].

More recently, economists Giovanni Peri and Vasil Yasenov re-analyzed the Mariel Boatlift data in 2019, concluding that Borjas' findings of negative wage impacts relied on an extremely narrow and statistically volatile control group [5]. When using a larger, more stable sample, they found no evidence of displacement or wage depression for native-born workers [5].

Conclusion

Ultimately, the claim that immigrants are taking "Black jobs" and "Hispanic jobs" is not supported by macroeconomic data. In the aggregate, the labor market has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to absorb millions of foreign-born workers while simultaneously delivering record-low unemployment rates for native-born Black and Hispanic Americans.

The primary economic drivers of employment and wage levels for Black and Hispanic workers are broader macroeconomic conditions—such as Federal Reserve monetary policy, educational attainment, technological automation, and infrastructure investment—rather than labor market competition from immigrants. While the academic debate continues over localized, short-term pressures in specific high-concentration, low-skilled sectors, the consensus of empirical research suggests that immigration functions as an economic complement that drives growth, rather than a zero-sum threat to American minority workers.